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HASC

OLL 84-3263/2
7 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [] Manual

STAT

1. On 7 September 1984, John Beckner, Assistant to Representative John R. Kasich (R., OH), a Member of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), came to Headquarters to read the [] Manual" that he requested on behalf of Representative Kasich.

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2. Mr. Beckner was informed that this office had obtained the paper in question, but that it could not be retained on Capitol Hill. An offer was made to take the paper down for the Congressman to read, but Mr. Kasich said that he would appreciate it if arrangements could be made for him to read the document himself here in Headquarters.

3. Mr. Beckner was informed that he could take brief notes, but that they would have to be stored at the HASC. He said that he fully understood our position and appreciated the fact that the Agency made the document available.

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[]
Chief, Liaison Division, OLL

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OLL 84-3263

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23 Aug 84
Date

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MEMBER:
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES


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Congress of the United States
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August 8, 1984



STAT

[redacted]
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear [redacted]

STAT

It was a pleasure speaking with you today,
and I am enclosing the reference to the [redacted]
[redacted] manual" which I am trying to get
hold of for Congressman Kasich.

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SIAI

[redacted]
[redacted] I appreciate your help in this
matter.

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Sincerely,

John Beckner
Asst. to Rep. Kasich

ILLEGIB



SOVIET COVERT ACTION (THE FORGERY OFFENSIVE)

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 6, 19, 1980



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APPENDIX

CIA STUDY: SOVIET COVERT ACTION AND PROPAGANDA

Presented to the Oversight Subcommittee, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 6 February 1980, by the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. I am pleased to have this opportunity of responding to the request of this committee of the House of Representatives that the CIA provide testimony concerning the current extensive and far reaching propaganda and covert political action program of the Soviet Union. This Soviet effort is aimed at supporting the Soviet Union's domestic, national security, and foreign policies, as well as fomenting and supporting revolution and subversion abroad in the name of international Communism and national liberation. This Soviet activity has internal and foreign aspects. Today, I will restrict my comment to Soviet (and Soviet Bloc) foreign propaganda and covert action. I shall not discuss the use of these tools by the Soviet Communist Party and government to control its own people.

2. In July of 1978 the Director of Central Intelligence provided this Committee with an unclassified study of Soviet propaganda activities, which was published by the Committee.¹ Today, I will not repeat all of the comment in that study; however, in these introductory remarks, I wish to make certain summary statements concerning the scope and nature of Soviet propaganda aimed at foreign audiences, its relation to covert actions of the Soviet Government's intelligence service, the Committee on State Security (KGB), and Soviet foreign policies. I will then provide more detailed comment on one of the most reprehensible features of Soviet covert action—the use of forged U.S. Government documents. Thereafter, I will describe as examples of combined propaganda/covert action operations the current heavily orchestrated Soviet campaign against the modernization of theater nuclear weapons in NATO and the previous heavy campaign against the development of enhanced radiation weapons in NATO. In conclusion, I then will comment briefly on the types of activities and techniques used by the Soviets in covert action and propaganda.

3. The Soviet Union's willingness to conduct its foreign policy in accordance with the implicit rules-of-the-game that were observed by both sides during the first phase of East-West detente has steadily eroded in recent years. This erosion has been especially evident in the increased intensity of Soviet propaganda efforts and certain covert action operations designed to reinforce overt propaganda lines.

4. The Soviet leadership regards propaganda and covert action as indispensable adjuncts to the conduct of foreign policy by traditional diplomatic, military and other means. Moscow is willing to spend large sums on propaganda and covert

¹ "The CIA and the Media," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, First and Second Sessions (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: 1978), pp. 531-627.

press the difference between the regular intelligence collection and counterintelligence functions of the Soviet secret services and clandestine operations which are intended to produce a certain political or propaganda impact. Active measures include a range of practices such as written and oral "disinformation" (forgeries, false rumors), "gray" and "black" propaganda, manipulation or control of foreign media assets, political action and "agent of influence" operations, clandestine radio stations, semi-clandestine use of foreign communist parties and international front and special action organizations, staged or manipulated demonstrations and even, in the past, blackmail, and kidnapping.

17. While all of these forms of covert action have been or are being used by the Soviet Union to expand its power and influence in the world, my testimony today focuses on one particular method—the production and dissemination of anti-U.S. forgeries. U.S. intelligence analysts who study "questioned documents" estimate that in the postwar era the Soviet Union and its East European allies have produced around 150 anti-U.S. forgeries of various types. Some were bogus pamphlets and phony leaflets attributed to non-existent organizations, some consisted of fabricated bank statements and still others were reproductions of entire issues of the American news magazine Newsweek.⁵ But the most important type of forgery is the authentic-looking but false official U.S. Government document or communiqué.

18. Documentary forgeries, which contain false, misleading or incomplete information, may be fabricated out of whole cloth or they may be altered versions of genuine documents and official forms which have been obtained by Soviet espionage agents. In both cases, the Soviets use such forgeries in elaborate deception games with the governments, media, and people of their leading adversaries. Anti-U.S. Government forgeries always convey implicitly or explicitly a false or distorted message about U.S. foreign policy intentions and actions, and they are designed to influence their intended recipient ("the victim") to reach conclusions or take actions which the forger believes will serve his own interests while undermining those of his opponent ("the enemy"). Depending upon their content, documentary forgeries may have a political, military, economic or counterintelligence slant; in practice most of them—and all of those discussed today—have a political purpose.

19. Forgeries may also be classified according to their intended recipient or victim. One type is aimed at misleading foreign government leaders and opinion-makers, thereby warping the decisionmaking process in the target country. Technically speaking, this is the "disinformation" or misinformation type of forgery; it is normally surfaced by "agents of influence" with access to higher government circles in the target country and almost never receives public attention. A second type of forgery, which may be called the propaganda forgery, is directed at molding public opinion in the target country or countries. It is usually planted surreptitiously in the foreign media in such a way that the Soviet hand is not revealed. After it has received sufficient replay in the non-communist media, the forgery is then almost always exploited by Soviet propagandists to support unsubstantiated allegations made in the official media which would otherwise appear spurious and unconvincing without "documentary" evidence to back them up.

20. Documentary forgeries are a preferred weapon in the Soviet Union's arsenal of active measures. So-called "paper" operations receive priority because they do not involve a high degree of political risk, such as public exposure of the

⁵ Newsweek issues of Nov. 18, 1963, and Dec. 16, 1963. Although the covers were somewhat representative of the real magazine, the contents were pure Soviet propaganda and did not in any way look like the real thing. The KGB has come a long way from its work of this period. Copies of the Newsweek forgeries appear as app. IV p. 190f

⁶ Definition of disinformation from a KGB training manual:
"Strategic disinformation assists in the execution of State tasks, and is directed at misleading the enemy concerning the basic questions of the State policy, the military-economic status, and the scientific-technical achievement of the Soviet Union; the policy of certain imperialist states with respect to each other and to other countries; and the specific counterintelligence tasks of the organs of State Security."

⁷ "Tactical disinformation makes it possible to carry out the individual task of strategic disinformation and, in fact, comprises the principal disinformation work of the organs of State Security."

This same manual notes:
"Disinforming on strategic matters falls within the jurisdiction of the government, the appropriate ministries and committees, and the high command of the country's armed forces. The organs of State Security constantly render assistance to the other departments on this matter..."